Robert Innes is a Professor of Agricultural Policy Analysis, Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Information and Risk and Environmental Economics in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Arizona.
Robert Innes' research has focused on a variety of issues in microeconomic theory, industrial organization, finance, agricultural policy, environmental economics, and law. He has received the Outstanding Ph.D. Dissertation (1987), Quality of Research Discovery (1994, 1999), and Distinguished Policy Contribution awards from the Agricultural Agricultural Economics Association, the Best Published Research Award (1999) from the Western Agricultural Economics Association, and the Hicks-Tinbergen Medal for outstanding research from the European Economic Association (1994).
Innes has also served on the faculty University of California (Davis) and as Senior Economist on the President's Council of Economic Advisers, where he developed and advanced a range of farm policy reforms ultimately proposed by the Clinton Administration for enactment in the 1996 Farm Bill.
Robert Innes received his BA, MBA and Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley.
Now Baron's first key paper, he models a symmetric information case between a potential target and an environmental organization and he concludes that with symmetric information, boycotts are unlikely to arise. This is what one would expect as an US economist that under symmetric information the fi...(Full transcript available to logged in subscribers.).
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